In Lohmeier v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 2025 WL 2348765 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 2025), the Seventh Circuit affirmed employer’s motion for summary judgment against its former employee. In Lohmeier, the plaintiff was employed as a nurse at defendant’s hospital. Plaintiff was terminated for behavioral concerns and suspected narcotics theft. Lohmeier, 2025 WL 2348765 at *1. Specifically, at least five coworkers observed and testified to plaintiff being “tired,” “under the influence of drugs,” with one witness stating that she “appeared intoxicated with slurred speech, slow reaction time, bloodshot eyes, droopy eyelids, and a misstep in her gait.” Id. at *2. Moreover, plaintiff had access to narcotics. Id. Colleagues reported that fentanyl and morphine had been removed from the medication dispenser and security footage showed that plaintiff had access to those drugs at the time they went missing. Plaintiff was evaluated, asked to finish her work and eventually sent home. Plaintiff was terminated following this incident.
Plaintiff brought suit against the hospital alleging discrimination on the basis of color and national origin, in violation of Title VII; disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); interference and retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA); and violations under the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). Id. Of the five statutes pled, the Seventh Circuit ruling predominately focused on the Title VII claim; noting that the record does not support the that plaintiff introduced evidence on key elements of the remaining claims.
Regarding the Title VII claim, the court reviewed the claim under both the McDonnell Douglas v. Green and the Ortiz v. Werner Enterprise approach. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination with evidence that (1) she is a member of the protected class; (2) she met her employer’s legitimate job expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Seventh Circuit’s analysis focuses on prong four: the treatment of similarly situated employees outside the protected class. Here, plaintiff pointed to the other ICU nurses on duty claiming they were similarly situated because they had the same supervisors, similar job duties, and access to the machines that dispense the narcotics plaintiff allegedly stole. Id. However, the Seventh Circuit notes that it was plaintiffs observed disoriented behavior that created a “critical ‘differentiating’ circumstance.” Id. In this instance “similarly situated” does not apply to the working environment but to the numerous reports that plaintiff appeared “tired, dazed, and out of sorts.” Id. at *6. Since the plaintiff’s observed behavior was different from her proposed comparators, plaintiff’s claim was unsuccessful under McDonnell Douglas. Id. at *6.
The Ortiz framework can be applied to a Title VII claim alleging discrimination on the basis of color or national origin. 834 F.3d 760. Under this framework, the court must consider plaintiff’s evidence in its totality to establish whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that a plaintiff’s protected characteristic caused the termination. Id. at*6. The Seventh Circuit reviewed five categories of plaintiff’s evidence including (a) improprieties in the initial investigation; (b) false claims; (c) deprivation of a meaningful grievance process; (d) policy violations; and (e) co-worker’s discriminatory animus. Id. Regarding the first three categories of evidence, the Seventh Circuit was not able to point to any connection between plaintiff’s allegations that the employer acted improperly to any tangible adverse action. Plaintiff did provide evidence that supported that the employer did violate its drug policy when it allowed plaintiff to finalize her charts before allowing her to drive home. Id. However, the Seventh Circuit held this evidence alone is not sufficient when considering the totality of the evidence provided at the summary judgment stage. Lastly, the court considered plaintiff’s evidence of anti-Hispanic comments plaintiff overheard by one of her colleagues to show racial animus. The Seventh Circuit reiterated that the statements must be a proximate cause of the termination in order to impute bias to the employer. Id., at *7. In this case, the employer’s internal investigation was not “wholly dependent” on the reports of the two colleagues who made the anti-Hispanic comments; because there were four additional witnesses who testified consistently with their report as it pertained to the plaintiff’s behavior and appearance during the incident. Id. Moreover, the employer submitted evidence of the security logs showing the plaintiff’s access to the stolen narcotics. Id. at*7. Therefore, the court could not impute the alleged anti-Hispanic comment to the employer.
The plaintiff’s Title VII claim of discrimination on the basis of national origin or color therefore failed under both the McDonnell Douglas and Ortiz frameworks.
By Amanda Burns, Caffarelli & Associates Ltd.
